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CHAPTER SIX
"in all civil cases where the state or any county or other political
subdivision of the state or any state officer as such is a party"
6.010. INTRODUCTION
The phrase "in all civil cases" was added to the sixth clause of the appel-
late jurisdictional provision in the 1945 constitution.' Also added was the
provision for supreme court jurisdiction when the state is a party.2 Thus,
there are presently four types of cases falling within this category over which
the supreme court exercises exclusive original appellate jurisdiction: when
one of the parties is (1) the state, (2) a county, (3) another political sub-
division, or (4) a state officer.
6.020. STATE A PARTY
The basic condition which must be satisfied before the supreme court will
hear an original appeal of a case falling within this category is that the state
1. Since the provision giving the supreme court jurisdiction of cases in which the
state is a party is also an innovation, probably the phrase "civil cases" was added in
an effort to distinguish the cases to be included in this category from criminal actions in
which the state is a party; jurisdiction of criminal appeals had already been allocated
under the "felony" category. See § 7.010. However, the one opinion considering the
new phrase "all civil cases" resurrected a judicial definition of a civil case as a legal
means for "the enforcement or protection of private rights, and redress or prevention of
private wrongs." State v. Harold, 364 Mo. 1052, 271 S.W.2d 527 (1954), trans'd,
281 S.W.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1955); cf. State ex rel. Kochtitzky v. Riley, 203 Mo. 175,
101 S.W. 567 (1907); In re McFarland, 223 Mo. App. 826, 12 S.W.2d 523 (1928);
State ex rel. Bixman v. Denton, 128 Mo. App. 304, 107 S.W. 446 (1908). State v.
Harold, supra, was an appeal from a juvenile proceeding in which the defendant was
adjudged a delinquent, having committed a burglary and larceny. Since a juvenile pro-
ceeding is not a true criminal action, the fact that the offense would be considered a
felony if committed by an adult did not give the supreme court jurisdiction. See § 7.010,
note 1. After holding that the case was not a criminal action, the court applied
the traditional definition of "civil case" and ruled that because the defendant had com-
mitted a public wrong the case was also not a civil action and transferred to the court
of appeals on both grounds. As will be discussed, notes 4-7 infra and accompanying text,
some public right or interest must be identified in order for the state to be considered
a party for jurisdictional purposes. Therefore, the court's use of the traditional definition
is misleading since it might be applied to all non-criminal actions, with the result that
the supreme court would not have jurisdiction in cases involving general or public welfare
in which the state is a party. In construing "civil cases" the traditional technical mean-
ing should be disregarded to avoid this anomaly; the addition of this term should be re-
garded solely as a means of distinguishing civil and criminal actions.
2. Under the 1875 constitution the supreme court would not take jurisdiction merely
because the state was a party to the case. State ex rel. Office of Civilian Defense Salvage
Comm. v. Homer, 353 Mo. 839, 184 S.W.2d 1002, trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 787, 187
S.W.2d 976 (1945).
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must be the real party in interest. Because the "state a party" provision was
added to this section in 1945 and relatively few cases have construed it,
litigants must often consult cases that either antedate the 1945 constitution
or concern non-jurisdictional issues to ascertain when the condition is satis-
fied.'
The principal requirement is that an identifiable public interest must be
involved in the case. Thus, the state has been held to be the real party in
interest in cases to enjoin the maintenance of a public nuisance," the opera-
tion of a nursing home,5 the unauthorized practice of medicine,6 and the
continuation of a private business enterprise in a state park.' The courts
have held also that jurisdiction belonged in the supreme court on the ground
of "state a party" in two cases' involving taxation by the state and in three
cases' involving enforcement of appearance bonds.
3. The existence of the state's pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case has
been termed immaterial in this connection. State ex tel. Delmar jockey Club v. Zachritz,
166 Mo. 307, 65 S.W. 999 (1901) (en banc). But see State ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Williams, 221 Mo. 227, 120 S.W. 740 (1909) (en banc).
For the rule that the state is not necessarily a party when one of its executive com-
missions is named as a party, see Christeson v. Highway Comm'n, 40 S.W.2d 615 (Mo.
1931), trans'd, 46 S.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1932); State ex tel. Highway Comm'n v. Bates,
317 Mo. 696, 296 S.W. 418 (1927) (en banc).
The question of whether the state is the real or merely a nominal party arises in cases
of quo warranto. There are two varieties of this action to test the validity of title. They
can be distinguished by the identity of the person serving as plaintiff in the respective
branches. In the common law action, instituted and prosecuted by the prosecuting
attorney or the attorney general, the state is said to be acting ex officio through its of-
ficers and is the real party in interest. If the statutory action of quo warranto is used
(Mo. REv. STAT. § 531.010 (1959)), the private person who seeks to institute the suit
and be named as private relator must have some peculiar interest which distinguishes
him from the general public. The private relator, rather than the state, is then deemed
the real party in interest. State ex tel. Dalton v. Mattingly, 268 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1954),
trans'd, 275 S.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1955); State ex tel. Handlan v. Wilkie Land Co., 349
Mo. 666, 162 S.W.2d 846 (1942), trans'd; State ex tel. Otto v. Hyde, 317 Mo. 714,
296 S.W. 775 (1927), trans'd; State ex tel. Wallach v. Schneider's Credit Jewelers,
243 S.W.2d. 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); see State ex tel. Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235,
258 S.W.2d 590 (1963) (en banc). A discussion of these two actions is found in
MIssouax BAR Ass'N, MissouRz APPELLATE PRACTICE 128-30, 133-39 (1963).
4. See State ex tel. Thrash v. Lamb, 237 Mo. 437, 141 S.W. 665 (1911) (en banc).
Although jurisdiction had to be predicated upon the other categories in 1911, presum-
ably the supreme court would now have jurisdiction of a similar case based on state a
party.
5. State ex tel. Eagleton v. Patrick, 370 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. 1963).
6. State ex rel. Collet v. Scopel, 316 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. 1958).
7. State ex tel. Taylor v. Anderson, 362 Mo. 513, 242 S.W.2d 66 (1961).
8. State v. Kosovitz, 342 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. 1961) (to collect delinquent income
taxes); In re Atkins Estate, 307 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1957) (to determine whether certain
property was exempt from income taxes). Cases such as these could probably be based
also on construction of revenue laws. See § 3.040.
9. State v. Norton, 347 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); State v. Haney, 277
1 6.020
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6.030. COUNTY A PARTY
To confer jurisdiction upon the supreme court, the county must be a
formal party to the record. Although the county is interested in the outcome
of the case, if only a county officer or board is named as party plaintiff or
defendant, the court of appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. Once
the county has been established a party to the record, the court will then
determine whether it is the real party in interest.11 No clearly identifiable
test is applied, although pecuniary interest of the county appears to be a
S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1955); State v. Haverstick, 317 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958),
trans'd, 326 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1959).
10. It is well established that the county is not a party to the case merely because
the judges of the county court are parties; the courts of appeals have jurisdiction in
such cases. Perkins v. Burks, 61 S.W.2d 756 (Mo.), trans'd, 64 S.W.2d 712 (Ct. App.
1933); Dietrich v. Brickey, 327 Mo. 189, 37 S.W.2d 428 (1931), trans'd, 48 S.W.2d 69
(Ct. App. 1932); State ex rel. Stipp v. Cornish, 19 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. 1929), trans'd,
223 Mo. App. 978, 24 S.W.2d 667 (1930); Village of Grandview v. McElroy, 318 Mo.
135, 298 S.W. 760 (1927), trans'd; State ex rel. Cornelius v. McClanahan, 273 S.W.
1059 (Mo.), trans'd, 221 Mo. App. 399, 278 S.W. 88 (1925); State ex rel. Nee v.
Gorsuch, 303 Mo. 295, 260 S.W. 455 (1924) (en banc), trans'd, 217 Mo. App. 480,
268 S.W. 665 (1925); State ex rel. Tadlock v. Mooneyham, 296 Mo. 421, 247 S.W.
163 (1922), trans'd, 212 Mo. App. 573, 253 S.W. 1098 (1923); Burrows v. County
Court, 308 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); State ex rel. Texas County v. White, 68
Mo. App. 503 (1897), trans'd.
In Bowman v. Phelps County, 36 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931), trans'd, 330 Mo.
826, 51 S.W.2d 3 (1932), it was held that when an account is presented to the county
court for payment out of county funds, the county is a party to the record. Othcrwise,
to make the county a party of record, the county clerk must be formally served. State ex
rel. Heath v. County Court, 324 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1959), trans'd, 331 S.W.2d 289 (Ct.
App. 1960). This is also true of St. Louis County, which has a special "home rule"
charter. State ex rel. Town of Olivette v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 273 S.W.2d 286 (Mo.
1954), trans'd, 280 S.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1955). In Witt v. City of Webster Groves, 383
S.W.2d 723 (Mo. 1964), trans'd, St. Louis County intervened in an action by which cer-
tain parties were seeking injunction and declaratory judgment that an annexation made
by the city of Webster Groves (which is located in St. Louis County) was invalid. The
county sought a declaration of the legal status of the city's annexation ordinance and
election. The supreme court was apparently satisfied that the county was sufficiently
a party in interest and a party to the record at the trial court. However, the case was
transferred on the ground that the county was not among the parties appealing the trial
court's judgment for the city. Cf. Freeman v. St. Louis Quarry Co., 30 Mo. App.
362 (1888) (dictum), trans'd.
See State ex rel. Thompson v. Roberts, 264 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.), trans'd, 269 S.W.2d
148 (Ct. App. 1954); State ex rel. Walker v. Locust Creek Drainage Dist., 58 S.W.2d
452 (Mo. 1933), trans'd, 228 Mo. App. 434, 67 S.W.2d 840 (1934).
11. State ex rel. Hickory County v. Dent, 121 Mo. 162, 25 S.W. 924 (1894), trans'd
from court of appeals; State ex rel. Ozark County v. Tate, 109 Mo. 265, 18 S.W. 1088
(1892); State ex rel. Hickory County v. Davis, 292 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956),
trans'd, 302 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1957). Each of these cases was an action on the bond
of a county official giving the supreme court jurisdiction because the county was deemed
the real party in interest.
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factor; in two cases the court of appeals was held to have jurisdiction be-
cause the county's liability would not be altered by the decision on appeal. 2
There are many cases which appear to have presented no difficult ques-
tions of jurisdiction in which supreme court jurisdiction was expressly based
on the fact that counties were parties."5
6.040. OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
Although the phrase "other political subdivision" appears to present a
potential "catchall" category, the courts, when faced with problems of
appellate jurisdiction, have given it a unique and limited definition. Thus,
12. In Barrett v. Stoddard County, 183 S.W. 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916), the par-
ticular proceeding from which the appeal was taken was incidental to the principal pro-
ceeding in which the county was a party. The court of appeals had jurisdiction since
the county would not be affected by the result in the incidental proceeding. The court
of appeals likewise had jurisdiction in Johnson County v. Bryson, 27 Mo. App. 341
(1887), since the county was a mere stakeholder.
13. Cases involving restitution of money: County of St. Francois v. Brookshire, 302
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1957); Howard County v. Moniteau County, 336 Mo. 295, 78 S.W.2d
96 (1934); Corbin v. Adair County, 171 Mo. 385, 71 S.W. 674 (1903); Meekins v.
Sullivan County, 154 Mo. 136, 55 S.W. 145 (1900); New Madrid County v. Phillips,
125 Mo. 61, 28 S.W. 321 (1894). Suits for salaries: Mooney v. County of St. Louis,
286 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1956); Cook v. County of St. Francois, 349 Mo. 484, 162 S.W.2d
252 (1942), trans'd from court of appeals; Chapman v. McDonald County, 5 S.W.2d
403 (Mo. 1928); Jenkins v. Shannon County, 226 Mo. 187, 125 S.W. 1100 (1910),
trans'd from court of appeals. Actions involving payment of warrants or bonds: Layson
v. Jackson County, 365 Mo. 905, 290 S.W.2d 109 (1956); Ballard v. Standard Print-
ing Co., 356 Mo. 552, 202 S.W.2d 780 (1947); Sturdivant Bank v. Stoddard County,
332 Mo. 568, 58 S.W.2d 702 (1933) (en banc); Howell County ex rel. Inhabitants of
Township 24 v. Wheeler, 108 Mo. 294, 18 S.W. 1080 (1892). Cases involving tax
assessments: Taney County v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 309 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1958);
Platte River Drainage Dist. v. Andrew County, 278 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1925). Other cases:
Estate of Ballard v. Clay County, 355 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1962) (discovery of assets
proceeding); Odell v. Pile, 260 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1953) (injunction); Greenfield v.
Petty, 346 Mo. 1186, 145 S.W.2d 367 (1940) (suit to quiet title).
There are also cases which involved at least one transfer, but in which the opinions
referred to no particular complication of the jurisdictional issue. This probably indicates
that the litigants had made clear-cut errors in the choice of appellate forum. State
ex rel. Spratley v. Maries County, 339 Mo. 577, 98 S.W.2d 623 (1936), trans'd from
court of appeals; Kansas City Sanitary Co. v. Laclede County, 307 Mo. 10, 269 S.W.
395 (1925) (en bane), trans'd from court of appeals; Taney County v. Addington,
296 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956), trans'd, 304 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1957); Fort Osage
Drainage Dist. v. Jackson County, 264 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954), trans'd, 275
S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1955); Howell County v. Cook, 48 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932),
trans'd; Franklin County v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 183 S.W. 1099 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916),
transd, 210 S.W. 874 (Mo. 1919); Reynolds v. Clark County, 73 Mo. App. 278 (1898),
trans'd, 162 Mo. 680, 63 S.W. 382 (1901); Allen v. Cowan, 30 Mo. App. 1, trans'd,
96 Mo. 193, 9 S.W. 587 (1888); Webster County v. Cunningham, 25 Mo. App. 358
(1887), trans'd.
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although certain governmental or corporate units might be called "political
subdivisions" for other purposes,' they will not necessarily be included for
jurisdictional purposes.
6.041. Townships
The present rule,'" first expressed in Harrison & Mercer County Drainage
Dist. v. Trail Greek Township," is that the supreme court has original ap-
pellate jurisdiction when a township within a county, which township was
created under the township organization statutes, is named as a party.1 The
holding in Harrison has been consistently followed.' 8
6.042. City of St. Louis
An 1876 amendment to the 1875 Missouri Constitution provided that St.
Louis should function as a corporate governmental unit in the dual capacity
of city and county.'" Because of this unique arrangement, St. Louis was
originally classified as a "political subdivision," giving the supreme court
exclusive original appellate jurisdiction when the city was a party in either
capacity.20
14. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 15. See also Long v. City of Independence, 360 Mo.
620, 229 S.W.2d 686 (1950).
15. Dictum to the contrary expressed in Wilson v. King's Lake Drainage & Levee
Dist., 237 Mo. 39, 139 S.W. 136 (1911), trans'd, 158 S.W. 931 (Ct. App. 1913),
should be disregarded.
16. 317 Mo. 933, 297 S.W. 1 (1927).
17. Id. at 941, 297 S.W. at 4.
18. Fleming v. Clark Township, 357 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1962); Cullor v. Jackson
Township, 249 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1952); Sherlock v. Duck Creek Township, 338 Mo.
868, 92 S.W.2d 675 (1936); Liberty Township v. Telford, 349 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961), trans'd, 358 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1962); see Grand River Township v.
Cooke Sales & Serv., Inc., 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954); Norborne Land Drainage Dist.
Co. v. Cherry Valley Township, 325 Mo. 1197, 31 S.W.2d 201 (1930); Wright County
ex rel. Elk Creek Township v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 30 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1930);
Reilly v. Sugar Creek Township, 232 Mo. App. 721, 121 S.W.2d 298 (1938),
trans'd; Missouri Township v. Farmers' Bank, 12 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928),
trans'd, 328 Mo. 868, 42 S.W.2d 353 (1931).
19. The purpose and language of this amendment were discussed in Lovins v. City of
St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1194, 84 S.W.2d 127 (1935), trans'd, 90 S.W.2d 430 (Ct. App.
1936). The combination of city and county functions is presently authorized by Mo.
CONST. art. VI, § 31.
20. Cases involving violations of city ordinances: City of St. Louis v. Southcombe,
320 Mo. 865, 8 S.W.2d 1001 (1928); City of St. Louis v. Murta, 283 Mo. 77, 222 S.W.
430 (1920); City of St. Louis v. Coffee, 76 Mo. App. 318 (1898), trans'd; City of St.
Louis v. Robinson, 55 Mo. App. 256 (1893), trans'd, 135 Mo. 460, 37 S.W. 110 (1896).
Cases involving property damages, personal injuries and alleged negligence of the city:
Volz v. City of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 362, 32 S.W.2d 72 (1930); Straub v. City of St.
Louis, 175 Mo. 413, 75 S.W. 100 (1903); Harman v. City of St. Louis, 55 Mo. App.
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This rule was changed in Lovins v. City of St. Louis.2 Presently, the
supreme court has original appellate jurisdiction only if St. Louis sues or is
sued in its governmental capacity as a county, rather than in its municipal
capacity. 2 Thus, the scope of supreme court jurisdiction over St. Louis
cases now coincides with jurisdiction based on "county a party." 3
175 (1893), trans'd, 137 Mo. 494, 38 S.W. 1102 (1897). Other cases: Gracey v. City
of St. Louis, 213 Mo. 384, 111 S.W. 1159 (1908) (suit for balance of salary); Steffen
v. City of St. Louis, 135 Mo. 44, 36 S.W. 31 (1896) (action on a contract); Riddle v.
Brown, 37 Mo. App. 550 (1889), trans'd (proceeding in nature of creditors' bill);
Freeman v. St. Louis Quarry Co., 30 Mo. App. 362 (1888), trans'd.
In handling these cases, the courts had required that the city be the real party in
interest, a fact determined by the use of several tests. First, the city had to be a formal
party to the record. City of St. Louis v. Dietering, 19 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1929), trans'd,
27 S.W.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1930). Thus, if a city board, rather than the city itself was
named, the supreme court did not have original appellate jurisdiction. State ex rel.
Horstkotte v. Board of Health, 90 Mo. 169, 2 S.W. 291 (1886). Also, some substantial
interest of the city had to be shown. This was normally a financial interest: City of St.
Louis ex rel. Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Ruecking Constr. Co., 212 S.W. 887 (Mo.
1919), trans'd; Hilton v. Universal Constr. Co., 212 S.W. 867 (Mo. 1919), trans'd,
202 Mo. App. 672, 216 S.W. 1034 (1920). However, some cases do not refer to this
pecuniary standard: Frolichstein v. Cupples' Station Light, Heat & Power Co., 201 S.W.
897 (Mo. 1918), trans'd, 201 Mo. App. 162, 210 S.W. 90 (1919); Bowser v. City of
St. Louis, 177 S.W. 610 (Mo. 1915), trans'd, 182 S.W. 1066 (Ct. App. 1916). Two
cases held that when the city was sued in its capacity as trustee of philanthropic funds,
the court of appeals had jurisdiction. Barnett v. City of St. Louis, 195 S.W. 1017 (Mo.),
trans'd, 198 S.W. 452 (Ct. App. 1917); Joyce Surveying Co. v. City of St. Louis, 68
Mo. App. 182 (1896).
21. 336 Mo. 1194, 84 S.W.2d 127 (1935), trans'd, 90 S.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1936).
22. Cases held to involve only the municipal capacity, over which the court of appeals
had jurisdiction have included condemnation proceedings: City of St. Louis v. Butler Co.,
358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (en banc), trans'd, 223 S.W.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1949);
City of St. Louis v. Essex Inv. Co., 356 Mo. 1204, 204 S.W.2d 726 (1947). Cases involv-
ing enforcement of municipal ordinances now are heard by the court of appeals; City of
St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo. 681, 216 S.W.2d 475 (1948); Superior Press Brick Co. v.
City of St. Louis, 152 S.W.2d 178 (Mo.), trans'd, 155 S.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1941);
Fischbach Brewing Co. v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1044, 87 S.W.2d 648 (1935),
trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 793, 95 S.W.2d 335 (1936). Personal injury actions against the
city: Keen v. City of St. Louis, 185 S.W.2d 23 (Mo.), trans'd, 189 S.W.2d 139 (Ct.
App. 1945); Koontz v. City of St. Louis, 84 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1935), trans'd, 230
Mo. App. 128, 89 S.W.2d 586 (1936); Fadem v. City of St. Louis, 99 S.W.2d 511 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1936). Other cases held to involve only the municipal capacity: Rowland v.
City of St. Louis, 327 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (involving city's capacity to
issue surveyor's licenses); McClellan v. City of St. Louis, 170 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App.
1943) (city's capacity to operate hospitals); City of St. Louis v. Gottschall, 121 S.W.2d
239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (city sued out execution on judgment).
In City of St. Louis v. Smith, 360 Mo. 406, 228 S.W.2d 780 (1950) (en bane), the
supreme court took jurisdiction apparently because the jurisdictional amount was met,
and held that certain employees should be paid for a lay-off period. In complying with
this ruling, the city made certain deductions from the payments, which action was
challenged as illegal in Wessler v. City of St. Louis, 242 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. Ct. App.
1 6.042
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6.043. Other Corporate Units
The supreme court cannot exercise original appellate jurisdiction merely
because a municipality is a party.24 Likewise, the following units have been
excluded from the meaning of "political subdivision" for purposes of juris-
diction: school districts;2" drainage, levee and road districts;"0 county hos-
pitals;2" and commissions of the state executive branch of government. 8
1951). The court of appeals retained jurisdiction in this case because the jurisdictional
amount was no longer specified, and the city was involved in only its municipal capacity.
Apparently jurisdiction of suits to determine a city employee's compensation or term of
office is in the supreme court if the employee performs a county rather than a municipal
function. Compare Holland v. City of St. Louis, 262 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1953), trans'd, 264
S.W.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1954), with Riley v. Holland, 362 Mo. 682, 243 S.W.2d 79
(1951).
23. Since the rules which were previously used by the supreme court to determine
when St. Louis was a real party to a case (see note 20 supra) are essentially those used
when a county is named a party (see notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text), the
effect of the Lovins decision has been to limit the number of cases in which jurisdiction
will be exercised. It has not changed the rules applied to those cases to determine if
the city is the real party.
24. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Hudspeth, 297 S.W.2d 510 (Mo.), trans'd,
303 S.W.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1957); Kansas City v. National Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 265 S.W.2d
384 (Mo. 1954); Ingle v. City of Fulton, 260 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1953), trans'd, 268
S.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1954); Long v. City of Independence, 360 Mo. 620, 229 S.W.2d
686 (1950); Stratton v. City of Warrensburg, 159 S.W.2d 766 (Mo.), trans'd, 237 Mo.
App. 280, 167 S.W.2d 392 (1942); Associated Holding Co. v. W. B. Kelley & Co.,
336 Mo. 851, 81 S.W.2d 624 (1935), trans-d, 230 Mo. App. 267, 90 S.W.2d 419 (1936);
McGill v. City of St. Joseph, 31 S.W.2d 1038 (Mo. 1930), trans'd, 225 Mo. App. 1033,
38 S.W.2d 725 (1931); Green v. Owen, 326 Mo. 450, 31 S.W.2d 1037 (1930), trans'd,
225 Mo. App. 746, 38 S.W.2d 496 (1931); City of St. Joseph v. Georgetown Lodge, 8
S.W.2d 979 (Mo.), trans'd, 222 Mo. App. 1076, 11 S.W.2d 1082 (1928); Village of
Grandview v. McElroy, 318 Mo. 135, 298 S.W. 760 (1927); Smith v. City of Sedalia,
228 Mo. 505, 128 S.W. 735 (1910), trans'd; City of Tarkio v. Loyd, 179 Mo. 600, 78
S.W. 797, trans'd, 109 Mo. App. 171, 82 S.W. 1127 (1904); City of Hannibal ex rel.
Bassen v. Bowman, 167 Mo. 535, 67 S.W. 214 (1902), trans'd, 98 Mo. App. 103, 71
S.W. 1122 (1903); Webb City & Carterville Waterworks Co. v. Webb City, 143 Mo. 493,
45 S.W. 279 (1898); Parker v. Zeisler, 139 Mo. 298, 40 S.W. 881 (1897), trans'd, 73
Mo. App. 537 (1898) (earlier cases taken inadvertently by supreme court rejected); City
of St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634, 34 S.W. 878 (1896); Kansas City v. Neal, 122
Mo. 232, 26 S.W. 695 (1894), trans'd; Felker v. City of Sikeston, 334 S.W.2d 754 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1960); McCullough v. City of Springfield, 241 Mo. App. 425, 236 S.W.2d
753 (1951). The rule is so well established that it is surprising to find recent opinions
which expressly reject contentions by litigants that the supreme court has jurisdiction
because a city is a party. State ex rel. Barnett v. Sappington, 260 S.W.2d 669 (Mo.
1953), trans'd, 266 S.W.2d 774 (1954); Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616
(Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
25. State ex Yel. Kugler v. Tillatson, 300 S.W.2d 517 (Mo.), trans'd, 304 S.W.2d 485
(Ct. App. 1957); Cooper v. School Dist., 362 Mo. 49, 239 S.W.2d 509 (1951); Young
v. Brassfield, 223 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1949), transd, 249 Mo. App. 35, 228 S.W.2d 823
(1950); Hydesburg Common School Dist. v. Rensselaer Common School Dist., 214
S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1948), trans'd, 218 S.W.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1949); State ex rel. Heppe v.
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6.050. STATE OFFICER A PARTY
The courts must rule upon two questions to determine whether the su-
preme court has jurisdiction under the "state officer" provision: (1) whether
a state officer is a party to the case, and (2) whether that officer is a con-
testing party.
6.051. Criteria for Deciding Whether a State Officer Is a Party
The courts have adopted a two-step approach to ascertain whether a
state officer is involved as a party. The first step requires the identification of
an individual governmental official; the second, his qualification as a "state
officer" under established definitional tests.
6.051(a). Identification of the Official
As the alignment of parties in certain kinds of actions has become more
complicated, distinctions have been drawn in the case law to cope with the
increasing complexities. The central jurisdictional requirement is that there
Zilafro, 206 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1947), trans'd, 210 S.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1948); Card-
well v. Howard, 345 Mo. 215, 132 S.W.2d 960 (1939), trans'd, 137 S.W.2d 652 (Ct.
App. 1940); Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Wellston Sewer Dist., 74 S.W.2d 621
(Mo.), trans'd, 77 S.W.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1934); Consolidated School Dist. v. Gower
Bank, 53 S.W.2d 280 (Mo.), trans'd, 55 S.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1932); Gray v. School
Dist., 20 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1929), trans'd, 224 Mo. App. 905, 28 S.W.2d 683 (1930);
State ex rel. Cravens v. Thompson, 322 Mo. 444, 17 S.W.2d 342, trans'd, 22 S.W.2d 196
(Ct. App. 1929); State ex rel. Consol. School Dist. v. Ingram, 317 Mo. 1141, 298 S.W.
37 (1927), trans'd, 2 S.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1928); State ex rel. School Dist. No. 4 v.
School Dist. No. 3, 238 Mo. 407, 141 S.W. 1111 (1911), trans'd, 163 Mo. App. 253,
146 S.W. 816 (1912); School Dist. v. Boyle, 182 Mo. 347, 81 S.W. 409 (1904),
trans'd, 113 Mo. App. 340, 88 S.W. 136 (1905); State ex rel. Federicktown School Dist.
v. Underwood School Dist., 250 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); State ex rel. McCain
v. Acorn, 241 Mo. App. 446, 236 S.W.2d 749 (1951); School Dist. v. Burris, 84 Mo.
App. 654 (1900).
26. St. Ferdinand Sewer Dist. v. Turner, 356 Mo. 804, 203 S.W.2d 731 (1947),
trans'd, 208 S.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1948); Drainage Dist. No. 28 v. Drainage Dist. No.
23, 144 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.), trans'd, 146 S.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1940); Bushnell v. Mis-
sissippi & Fox River Drainage Dist., 340 Mo. 811, 102 S.W.2d 871 (1937), trans'd,
233 Mo. App. 921, 111 S.W.2d 946 (1938); Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Wellston
Sewer Dist., 74 S.W.2d 621 (Mo.), trans'd, 77 S.W.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1934); Chilton v.
Drainage Dist., 332 Mo. 1173, 61 S.W.2d 744 (1933), trans'd from 224 Mo. App. 467,
28 S.W.2d 120 (1930), retrans'd, 228 Mo. App. 4, 63 S.W.2d 421 (1933); Wheat v.
Platte City -enefit Assessment Special Rd. Dist., 330 Mo. 1245, 52 S.W.2d 856 (1932),
trans'd, 227 Mo. App. 869, 59 S.W.2d 88 (1933); Wilson v. King's Lake Drainage &
Levee Dist., 237 Mo. 39, 139 S.W. 136 (1911) (en banc), trans'd, 176 Mo. App. 470,
158 S.W. 931 (1913).
27. Stribling v. Jolley, 362 Mo. 995, 245 S.W.2d 885 (en banc), trans'd, 241 Mo.
App. 1123, 253 S.W.2d 519 (1952).
28. Wheat v. Platte City Benefit Assessment Special Rd. Dist., 330 Mo. 1245, 52
S.W.2d 856 (1932), trans'd, 227 Mo. App. 869, 59 S.W.2d 88 (1933).
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must be an individual named as a party in his capacity as a state officer.20
This requirement has caused difficulties regarding collective activity of
officials comprising state executive or administrative agencies.
Prior to 1945, many of these state agencies or commissions had no inde-
pendent legal substance, and could sue and be sued only in the names of the
individuals who comprised them. The courts held that because the title of
these agencies was a collective name for these individuals, the supreme court
had jurisdiction of cases involving agency activities."0
Article IV, section twelve of the 1945 constitution provided that the exec-
utive branch of government should consist of the governor, lieutenant gover-
nor, state treasurer, state auditor, secretary of state, attorney general and the
several executive departments (revenue, education, highways, conservation,
agriculture, "and such additional departments, not exceeding five in numbet
as may hereafter be established by law"). It was also provided that "unless
discontinued, all present or future boards, bureaus, commissions, and other
agencies of the state exercising administrative or executive authority shall be
assigned by the governor to the department to which their respective powers
and duties are germane.'
Since the executive reorganization much of the important work of the
executive branch has been carried on by commissions which can sue and be
sued in corporate capacities. Since the adversary interests in proceedings
have been reposed in these legal entities, rather than in the persons who com-
pose them, the supreme court has refused to take jurisdiction, because of the
29. Compare Shepherd v. Department of Revenue, 370 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1963),
trans'd, with Felker v. Carpenter, 340 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1960), and Missouri Ins. Co. v.
Morris, 255 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1953). Although each case involved the Department of
Revenue, the supreme court retained jurisdiction only in the latter two, in which the
director of revenue was an actual party as an individual.
30. E.g., American Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Keitle, 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S.W.2d 447 (1945)
(Unemployment Compensation Commission); Shelley v. Commission for the Blind, 309
Mo. 612, 274 S.W. 688 (1925) (en banc). In many of these cases the court's approach
is awkward since it is caught between the need to conceive of the commission and its
component members as one entity and the traditional urge in approaching a complex
alignment of named parties to seek out natural persons suing or being sued in their of-
ficial capacities. See State ex rel. Office of Civilian Defense Salvage Comm. v. Homer,
353 Mo. 838, 184 S.W.2d 1002, trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 787, 187 S.W.2d 976 (1945);
Foster v. Commission for the Blind, 327 Mo. 416, 37 S.W.2d 450 (1931). See three
cases dealing with the old State Board of Health: State ex rel. Lentine v. Board of
Health, 334 Mo. 220, 65 S.W.2d 943 (1933); State ex rel. Horton v. Clark, 320 Mo.
1190, 9 S.W.2d 635 (1928) (en banc); State ex rel. Conway v. Hiller, 266 Mo. 242, 180
S.W. 538 (1915) (en banc).
31. Mo. CONST. art IV, § 12. Administrative Law Comm. for the Missouri Bar,
Survey of Mo. Administrative Agencies, 19 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 227, 243-62 (1951),
contains a treatment of the plan submitted to carry out this assignment, and an outline
of the assignment made.
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absence of an identifiable individual state officer who can be named as a
party. (This result was also reached before 1945 in cases involving a few
agencies, including the Highway Commission32 and the Public Service Com-
mission 3 which were incorporated prior to that year.) Since 1945 this has
32. The Highway Commission was held not to be a "state officer" for purposes of
jurisdiction in State ex tel. Highway Comm'n v. Hudspeth, 297 S.W.2d 510 (Mo.),
trans'd, 303 S.W.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1957); Pope Constr. Co. v. Highway Comm'n, 337
Mo. 30, 84 S.W.2d 920 (1935), transd, 230 Mo. App. 502, 92 S.W.2d 974 (1936);
Wheat v. Platte City Benefit Assessment Special Rd. Dist., 330 Mo. 1245, 52 S.W.2d
856 (1932), trans'd, 227 Mo. App. 869, 59 S.W.2d 88 (1933); Christeson v. Highway
Comm'n, 40 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. 1931), trans'd, 46 S.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1932); State
ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Carroll, 34 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1931), trans'd, 226 Mo. App.
563, 44 S.W.2d 1105 (1932); State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Day, 327 Mo. 122, 35
S.W.2d 37 (1930) (en banc), tran'd, 226 Mo. App. 884, 47 S.W.2d 147 (1932).
33. The awkwardness of the search for individual state officers when the principal
work is being done by a commission is pointed up in the myriad of transfers and appeals
regarding this commission in the 1930's. The statutes pertaining to the Public Service
Commission had purported to confer jurisdiction upon the supreme court in all cases to
which the commission was a party, whether or not the jurisdictional amount requirement
was met. Since the commission was a corporate entity, not a "state officer," the statutory
provision was held to be an unconstitutional attempt by the general assembly to extend
the jurisdiction of the supreme court beyond the constitutionally enumerated categories.
State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 92 S.W.2d 881 (Mo.), trans'd, 100 S.W.2d
636 (Ct. App. 1936); State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 90 S.W.2d 394 (Mo.),
trans'd, 100 S.W.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1936); State ex rel. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 338 Mo. 572, 92 S.W.2d 882 (1935), trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 293,
98 S.W.2d 126 (1936); State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 90 S.W.2d 395
(Mo. 1935), trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 446, 100 S.W.2d 637 (1936); State ex rel. Pitcairn
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 338 Mo. 180, 90 S.W.2d 392 (1935), trans'd, 100 S.W.2d 635
(Ct. App. 1937); State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 338 Mo. 177, 90 S.W.2d
390 (1935), trans'd, 99 S.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1936). All of these cases were transferred
to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeals because the supreme
court had held unconstitutional only the one provision vesting jurisdiction in the supreme
court, and had left the rest of the statute intact. One remaining provision stated that
the courts of appeals would have no jurisdiction of cases involving this commission.
In addition, the court of appeals also dismissed another case which had been transferred
to it: State ex rel. Hunter v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. Ct. App.
1936).
The next step in the confusion came in State ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Shan, 341 Mo.
19, 106 S.W.2d 898 (1937), an original action in the supreme court for mandamus to
compel the judges of the Kansas City Court of Appeals to set aside their judgment dis-
missing State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1937).
The supreme court was faced with the embarrassing task of holding that the court of ap-
peals should have taken the case on the ground that the statutory provision divesting the
latter court of jurisdiction was also unconstitutional, in spite of the fact that the supreme
court declined to announce this in an earlier opinion denying a rehearing in State ex rel.
Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra. The party moving for re-
hearing had contended that the transfer to the court of appeals had left him without a
tribunal in which to appeal.
Accordingly, the alternative writ of mandamus issued in the Shain case, supra, was
made peremptory, and, by stipulation, the disposition of this case governed the original
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been expressly held to be the rule in cases involving the Department of
mandamus actions brought in the supreme court after the dismissal by the court of ap-
peals of the other two Pitcairn cases and the Orscheln case, supra. State ex rel. Pitcairn
v. Shain, 341 Mo. 27, 106 S.W.2d 901 (1937).
The opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 232 Mo. App. 609, 110 S.W.2d 367 (1937), trans'd from 92 S.W.2d 881
(Mo. 1936), which it heard in conformity to the mandate of the supreme court, is en-
lightening in its bitterness:
In so far as this court is concerned, we enter an uncharted field in so far as any
assumption of jurisdiction or declarations of law by this court touching the acts of
the Public Service Commission are concerned. It follows that the most available
light for our guidance is the conclusions reached and principles laid down by the
Supreme Court during the many years that Court assumed exclusive jurisdiction in
matters of final appeal from the findings and orders of the Commission. Id. at 610,
110 S.W.2d at 367-68.
The court went on to point out that matters concerning the commission are often tied
in with constitutional issues over which the court of appeals could exercise no jurisdiction.
Id. at 610-11, 110 S.W.2d at 368. This was a recognition of the possibility that the su-
preme court, because of the division of appellate jurisdiction, is more able to act as final
arbiter in these cases. That is, the courts of appeals can only go so far in their efforts to
develop a body of case law, before reaching a point at which the supreme court must
take over. This view is bolstered by the fact that the courts of appeals are bound by
Mo. CONST. art. V, § 2 to follow the latest controlling decision of the supreme court.
This is true even though the court of appeals feels that the latest decision of the su-
preme court is outmoded or poorly considered. E.g., Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 238 Mo. App. 46, 176 S.W.2d 506 (1943); Benton v. Kansas City, 237 Mo. App.
385, 168 S.W.2d 476 (1943); Sparks v. Knight Templars & Masonic Life Indem. Co.,
61 Mo. App. 109 (1895). The court of appeals may also find that decisions of the su-
preme court are confusing and that it will be difficult to announce a decision which
would not be susceptible of being called contrary to the latest ruling of the supreme
court. Faced with this dilemma, the court of appeals may, after reaching its decision,
choose to transfer the case to the supreme court for final disposition under Mo. CoNST.
art. V, § 10 (this procedure is discussed in "Introduction," text accompanying notes 50-
54). See Gennari v. Prudential Ins. Co., 324 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). Because
the court of appeals must be careful in this regard when approaching a complex field of
law, its ability to effect needed changes and to announce progressive decisions is ham-
pered.
It is therefore arguable that the supreme court's restrictive outlook which resulted in
this division of the commission cases has gone against the grain of the growing recog-
nition in this state of the need for a more integrated system of review. See Administra-
tive Law Comm. of the Missouri Bar, Survey of Mo. Administrative Agencies, 19 U.
KAr. CrY L. REV. 227, 268-74 (1951). Also noteworthy is the provision in PRoF. No.
290, § 1, PRoPosArs oF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1943-1944, that
"appeals shall lie ...to the Supreme Court in all cases and proceedings wherein any
order or decision of the Public Service Commission of Missouri is reviewed." For dis-
cussion of this and similar proposals for changes in the new constitution, see "Intro-
duction," note 30.
However, there is a theoretical alternative to the view that the supreme court has de-
creased the efficiency of administrative review. Fitzpatrick, The Reviewing Courts of
Ill., 1952 U. ILL. L.F. 5, 22-23, suggests that the supreme court of a state may exercise
control over the development of law in a given area without hearing all the appellate
cases that arise in that area; that in fact it should be relieved of the obligation of hear-
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Labor and Industrial Relations,"4 the Department of Public Health and
ing cases of triffing importance. Rather, the supreme court should exercise control by
selectively reviewing, in its discretion, the most important cases in a given area. If this
may be said to characterize the theory of the Missouri appellate system, perhaps the
present allocation of jurisdiction over the commission cases approaches a practical realiza-
tion of the theory. That is, cases meeting the jurisdictional "amount" or which raise a
constitutional question (which the supreme court must hear on original appeal) are more
likely the most important cases. In addition, the supreme court has the discretionary
power to review decisions of the courts of appeals under Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10. (See
"Introduction," text accompanying notes 50-51 for a discussion of this review procedure.)
However, adoption of this view detracts from the dignity of the courts of appeals and,
in effect, compounds whatever stunting effect results from the jurisdictional disadvantages
of those courts. But as seen, failure to adopt this view leads to the conclusion that in
these cases the supreme court with one sweep (at least in theory if not in practice) di-
minished the effectiveness of administrative review regarding the Public Service Com-
mission.
The matter stands as it did after the confusion ended in 1937. The general assembly
amended the statute to read that appeals should be taken to the court having "appellate
jurisdiction in this state." Mo. LAws 1937, at 434. Jurisdiction is now divided between
the courts of appeals and the supreme court, the latter having jurisdiction only if a con-
stitutional issue is raised or if the jurisdictional "amount" is met. E.g., State ex rel. Har-
line v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 332 S.W.2d 940 (Mo.), trans'd, 343 S.W.2d 177 (Ct. App.
1960); American Petroleum Bxch. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 172 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.),
trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 92, 176 S.W.2d 533 (1943).
34. This department was organized in 1946, pursuant to the enabling provision in
the constitution for the establishment of new executive departments. Mo. LAws 1945,
at 1107. It is organized into several divisions which are corporate entities over which the
supreme court has refused to take jurisdiction unless the case falls within one of the other
jurisdictional categories. The present Division of Unemployment Security was known as
the Unemployment Compensation Commission before the executive reorganization, and
was not a corporate entity. It could sue or be sued only in the name of the three indi-
vidual commissioners who were regarded as state officers for jurisdictional purposes.
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Keitle, 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S.W.2d 447 (1945); Cape Girar-
deau Sand Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 353 Mo. 828, 184 S.W.2d 605
(1945); Atkisson v. Murphy, 352 Mo. 644, 179 S.W.2d 27 (1944); Trianon Hotel Co.
v. Keitle, 350 Mo. 1041, 169 S.W.2d 891 (1943) (court distinguished cases involving
corporate commissions); A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184 (1941); Murphy v. Doniphan Tel. Co., 347 Mo. 372, 147
S.W.2d 616 (1941); Murphy v. Hurlbut Undertaking & Embalming Co., 346 Mo. 405,
142 S.W.2d 449 (1940). The supreme court took jurisdiction of these cases. However,
in the executive reorganization, the Division of Employment Security was created as a
corporate entity and the supreme court ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction due to
the absence of an individual state officer as a party. E. B. Jones Motor Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, Div. of Employment Security, 298 S.W.2d 407 (Mo.), trans'd, 305 S.W.2d
889 (Ct. App. 1957); Howell v. Division of Employment Security, 358 Mo. 459, 215
S.W.2d 467 (1948), trans'd, 240 Mo. App. 931, 222 S.W.2d 953 (1949); Parker
v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 358 Mo. 365, 214 S.W.2d 529 (1948),
trans'd, 221 S.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1949) (lengthy discussion of the reorganization in-
cluded in this opinion).
The Division of Workmen's Compensation, formerly known as the Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission, was a corporate entity before the reorganization. Thus, the courts
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Welfare,3" the Board of Chiropractic Examiners,"0 the Board of Optometry"7
and the boards of regents of state colleges.38
As a general rule the corporate unit is the only "necessary and proper"
party, and litigants will not obtain a supreme court hearing by naming in-
dividuals who are affiliated with the unit." However, in cases in which an
individual member of a commission or department can be identified as the
official who made the administrative determination contested by the suit40
or who might be subjected to criminal penalties upon an adverse result,"1
this individual is the proper party, and original appellate jurisdiction lies in
the supreme court.
6.051(b). Qualification of the Official as a "State Officer"
Once an individual official was identified, the determination whether he
was a "state officer" within the meaning of article V, section three was tradi-
tionally based on the requirement that his duties and functions must be co-
extensive with the geographical boundaries of the state."2 In a few recent
of appeals have had jurisdiction both before and after the reorganization. Trokey v.
United States Cartridge Co., 214 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1948), trans'd, 222 S.W.2d 496 (Ct.
App. 1949); State ex rel. Goldman v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 325 Mo. 153,
27 S.W.2d 1026, trans'd, 225 Mo. App. 59, 32 S.W.2d 142 (1930). See the discussion
of jurisdictional amount in connection with the workmen's compensation cases, § 9.022
(b).
35. Dunnegan v. Gallop, 369 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1963), trans'd, 374 S.W.2d 407 (Ct.
App. 1964); Jones v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 354 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1962). The Social Security Commission (now the Division of Welfare, assigned to
this department) was also held to be a corporate entity and not a state officer in White
v. Social Security Comm'n, 345 Mo. 1046, 137 S.W.2d 569 (1940), trans'd. For an out-
line of the structure of this department, see Administrative Law Comm. of the Missouri
Bar, Survey of Mo. Administrative Agencies, 19 U. KAN. Crry L. Rv. 227, 257-59
(1951).
36. State ex rel. Gibson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 365 S.W.2d 773 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1963).
37. State ex rel. Missouri Optometric Ass'n v. Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc., 243
S.W.2d 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
38. Koch v. Board of Regents, 256 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953), trans'd, 265 S.W.2d 421
(Ct. App. 1954).
39. Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., 214 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1948), trans'd, 222
S.W.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1949); State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 338 Mo. 177,
90 S.W.2d 390 (1935), trans'd, 99 S.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1936).
40. Compare Shepherd v. Department of Revenue, 370 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1963), with
Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1963).
41. Department of Penal Institutions v. Wymore, 350 Mo. 127, 165 S.W.2d 618
(1942). Here the individual commissioners would have been subjected to penalties if
their official acts had been held to violate the Drivers' License Act.
42. State ex rel. Kirks v. Allen, 250 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1952), trans'd, 255 S.W.2d
144 (Ct. App. 1953); Murphy v. Hurlbut Undertaking & Embalming Co., 346 Mo. 405,
142 S.W.2d 449 (1940); Fischbach Brewing Co. v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1044, 87
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cases, the courts have used another test, which either supersedes or supple-
ments the earlier rule: to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court the official
"must exercise a portion of the sovereign power of government independ-
ently and without control of a superior power other than the law.""3 The
courts, in an effort to keep the jurisdictional categories distinct, have refused
to confuse these tests with those applied to determine whether a person holds
an "office under this state" in the "title to office" category."
The case law, principally through use of the "co-extensive with bounda-
ries" test, has excluded from the jurisdictional definition of "state officer"
officials who hold positions at the municipal,"5 township,"' and county47
S.W.2d 648 (1935), trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 793, 95 S.W.2d 335 (1936); Bank of Dar-
lington v. Atwood, 325 Mo. 123, 27 S.W.2d 1029, trans'd, 225 Mo. App. 974, 36 S.W.2d
429 (1930); State ex rel. Rucker v. Hoffman, 313 Mo. 667, 288 S.W. 16 (1926), trans'd,
294 S.W. 429 (Ct. App. 1927); State ex rel. Foerstel v. I-Iggins, 144 Mo. 410, 46 S.W.
423, trans'd, 76 Mo. App. 319 (1898); State ex rel. Holmes v. Dillon, 90 Mo. 229, 2
S.W 417 (1886).
43. Shepherd v. Department of Revenue, 370 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. 1963), trans'd,
377 S.W.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1964).
The adoption of the current test, which appears to have been inadvertent, can be
traced in the history of three cases. In State ex tel. Webb v. Pigg, 363 Mo. 133, 137-38,
249 S.W.2d 435, 438 (1952), the court, with regard to a non-jurisdictional issue, inter-
preted "state officer" as used in Mo. CONST. art. VII, § 13 to require that the official
must have been delegated part of the governmental sovereignty of the state to be exer-
cised for the public benefit without control of a superior power other than the law.
In Mosman v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 254 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), trans'd,
265 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1954), the court mentioned both tests and apparently used the
article VII, section thirteen rule for the purposes of deciding the jurisdictional question.
The Shepherd case, supra, does not even mention the earlier "co-extensive" test, and in
a footnote, 370 S.W.2d at 382, cites Pigg, acknowledging the identity of the current test
as that used in cases involving article VII, section thirteen.
Conceivably, the effect of exclusive use of the test previously used only for article
VII could limit the number of cases heard by the supreme court under this jurisdictional
category. That is, if an official's duties are prescribed and controlled by the dictates of
a superior officer, rather than by statute or constitutional provision, he is not a "state
officer" so as to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court, even if his duties extend through-
out the state. On the other hand, officers such as county prosecutors, who have been
excluded under the "co-extensive" test (see note 47 infra), might be included as state
officers under the article VII test. It seems likely that when faced with this contention
the supreme court will hold that the two tests are complementary rather than mutually
exclusive.
44. See § 4.020.
45. State ex tel. Barnett v. Sappington, 260 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. 1953), trans'd, 266
S.W.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1954) (city councilmen); State ex rel. Bouckaert Bros. v.
Mathews, 159 S.W.2d 767 (Mo.), trans'd, 162 S.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1942); Fischbach
Brewing Co. v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1044, 87 S.W.2d 648 (1935), trans'd, 231 Mo.
App. 793, 95 S.W.2d 335 (1936) (city license and excise commissioners); State ex rel.
Foerstel v. Higgins, 144 Mo. 410, 46 S.W. 423, trans'd, 76 Mo. App. 319 (1898)
(board of election commissioners); State ex tel. Horstkotte v. Board of Health, 90 Mo.
169, 2 S.W. 291 (1886), dismissing appeal from 16 Mo. App. 8 (1884); Britton v. Steber,
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levels. Two cases4" have excluded persons holding offices at the state level
because their duties were limited to particular areas within the state. In a
number of cases, the supreme court has made only passing reference to the
question of its jurisdiction, because it was clear that a state officer was named
as a party.49
62 Mo. 370 (1876) (mayor); State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Comm'rs, 80 Mo. App.
206 (1899), trans'd, 184 Mo. 109, 71 S.W. 215 (1902) (city policeman).
46. State ex rel. Schonhorst v. Hinning, 110 Mo. 82, 19 S.W. 494 (1892).
47. State ex rel. Kirks v. Allen, 250 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1952), trans'd, 255 S.W.2d
144 (Ct. App. 1953) (prosecuting attorney); Young v. Brassfield, 223 S.W.2d
491 (Mo. 1949), trans'd, 241 Mo. App. 35, 228 S.W.2d 823 (1950) (county clerk and
clerk of school district); Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Wellston Sewer Dist., 74
S.W.2d 621 (Mo.), trans'd, 77 S.W.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1934) (county treasurer); Dietrich
v. Brickey, 327 Mo. 189, 37 S.W.2d 428 (1931), trans'd, 48 S.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1932)
(county treasurer); Hill v. Hopson, 221 Mo. 103, 120 S.W. 29 (1909), trans'd, 150 Mo.
App. 611, 131 S.W. 357 (1910) (county court judges and road overseer); State ex rel.
Berder v. Spencer, 91 Mo. 206, 3 S.W. 410 (1887), trans'd (sheriff); Paddock-Hawley
Iron Co. v. Mason, 2 S.W. 841 (Mo. 1887), dismissing appeal from 16 Mo. App. 320
(1884) (sheriff); State ex rel. Holmes v. Dillon, 90 Mo. 229, 2 S.W. 417 (1886)
(sheriff); State ex rel Consol. School Dist. v. Blackwell, 254 S.W.2d 243, (Mo. Ct. App.
1952) (county clerk); State ex rel. Bartle v. Coleman, 33 Mo. App. 470 (1889)
(county court judges). State ex rel. Rucker v. Hoffman, 313 Mo. 667, 288 S.W. 16
(1926), trans'd, 294 S.W. 429 (Ct. App. 1927), held that a circuit judge is not a state
officer and overruled State ex rel. Albers v. Homer, 10 Mo. App. 307 (1881).
A few cases exclude school district officials from the jurisdictional definition of "state
officer." E.g., Cooper v. School Dist., 362 Mo. 49, 239 S.W.2d 509 (1951); State ex rel.
Gorman v. Offut, 9 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1928), trans'd, 26 S.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1930);
State ex rel. Consol. School Dist. v. Ingram, 317 Mo. 1141, 298 S.W. 37 (1927), trans'd,
2 S.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1928).
48. Bank of Darlington v. Atwood, 325 Mo. 123, 27 S.W.2d 1029, trans'd, 225 Mo.
App. 974, 36 S.W.2d 429 (1930); John O'Brien Boiler Works Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank,
282 Mo. 670, 222 S.W. 788 (1920), trans'd, 231 S.W. 1053 (Ct. App. 1921) (members
of board of state hospital). The first case involved a peculiar application of the "co-
extensive" test to the commissioner of finance, whose general duties did comply with the
test; but he was acting in the particular capacity as liquidating agent for a bank and
his duties were limited to a given area. However, this variation of the "co-extensive" test
was apparently a makeweight to fortify the principal holding that he was not a con-
testing party in any capacity (see note 50 infra) ; it is therefore doubtful authority outside
this context.
49. Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (1964) (state treasurer); Chaffin v. County of
Christian, 359 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (state auditor and attorney general);
Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 334 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1960); Van Hoose v.
Smith, 355 Mo. 799, 198 S.W.2d 23 (1946) (state auditor); Orr v. Hoehn, 353 Mo.
426, 182 S.W.2d 596 (1944) (state auditor); Sampson Distrib. Co. v. Cherry, 346 Mo.
885, 143 S.W.2d 307 (1940) (inspector of oils and motor fuels); State v. Farmers'
Exch. Bank, 331 Mo. 689, 56 S.W.2d 129 (1932) (secretary of state); Butler v. Board
of Educ., 16 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1929) (state auditor).
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6.052. When Is a State Officer a Contesting Party?
If a named individual official is identified as a state officer, he must be
shown to be a real party to the action before the supreme court will exercise
original appellate jurisdiction. That is, the officer must be engaged in the
pending action in a true adversary or contesting capacity."0 Administrative
50. There are some interesting parallels in the development of the case law pertain-
ing to the state superintendent of insurance and the state commissioner of finance. Since
well before 1945, both officials have had duties relating to the regulation of financial
institutions (insurance companies and banks respectively) and both have had duties in
the nature of receivership over the assets of financially unstable institutions. The basis for
supreme court jurisdiction when the superintendent of insurance is a party was stated in
State ex rel. Waddell v. Smith, 131 Mo. 176, 33 S.W. 11 (1895): the assets of the
corporation vested absolutely in the superintendent who was to defend and prosecute all
actions in his own name. Compare Barnett v. City of St. Louis, 195 S.W. 1017 (Mo.),
trans'd, 198 S.W. 452 (Ct. App. 1917); Joyce Surveying Co. v. City of St. Louis, 68
Mo. App. 182 (1896). The latter held that a political subdivision sued in its capacity as
trustee of philanthropic funds was not the real party in interest and that jurisdiction was
in the court of appeals. Other cases in which the supreme court has taken jurisdiction be-
cause the superintendent of insurance was a party are as follows: Clay v. Eagle Reciprocal
Exch., 368 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1963); First Nat'l Bank v. Higgins, 357 S.W.2d 139 (Mo.
1962); Klaber v. O'Malley, 90 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. 1935); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co.
v. Blake, 242 Mo. 23, 145 S.W. 438 (1912); Reichenbach v. EIIerbe, 52 Mo. App. 72
(1892), trans'd, 115 Mo. 588, 22 S.W. 573 (1893).
In 1930 the Kansas City Court of Appeals transferred to the supreme court two
cases in which the commissioner of finance was handling bank assets. Linehart v. Farmers'
State Bank, 27 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930), trans'd (apparently retransferred by
supreme court without opinion since a second court of appeals opinion appears at 226
Mo. App. 588, 43 S.W.2d 1062 (1931)); Tate v. Cantley, 23 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. Ct. App.
1930), trans'd (no indication in reporter and citator system that case was retransferred).
However, in that same year the supreme court distinguished the respective capacities of
the superintendent and the commissioner, holding that the latter could not be the real
party in interest since he was acting only as a liquidating agent for the private concern.
Bank of Darlington v. Atwood, 325 Mo. 123, 27 S.W.2d 1029, trans'd, 225 Mo. App.
974, 36 S.W.2d 429 (1930). Following this holding there was a deluge of opinions in
which the supreme court denied jurisdiction when the commissioner was a party. In re
Wellston Trust Co., 131 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1939), trans'd, 136 S.W.2d 430 (Ct. App.
1940); State v. Farmers' Exch. Bank, 331 Mo. 689, 56 S.W.2d 129 (1932); Consolidated
School Dist. v. Gower Bank, 53 S.W.2d 280 (Mo.), trans'd, 55 S.W.2d 713 (Ct. App.
1932); Cantley v. Piggott, 331 Mo. 30, 52 S.W.2d 846 (1932); City of Doniphan v.
Cantley, 330 Mo. 639, 50 S.W.2d 658 (en banc), trans'd, 52 S.W.2d 417 (Ct. App.
1932). These cases all arose during the depression, when the many bank failures resulted
in multiplication of suits for preferences in bank assets. It is arguable that the supreme
court employed this somewhat technical distinction to limit its jurisdiction over these cases.
The supreme court has taken jurisdiction of three cases to which the superintendent
or the commissioner or both were parties in some capacity other than in a representa-
tive capacity for a private concern undergoing liquidation. Old Reliable Atlas Life
Soc'y v. Leggett, 364 Mo. 630, 265 S.W.2d 302 (1954) (declaratory judgment against
the superintendent); Leggett v. General Indem. Exch., 363 Mo. 273, 250 S.W.2d 710
(1952) (action to dissolve an insurance exchange); Mutual Bank & Trust Co. v.
Shaffner, 248 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1952) (declaratory judgment against commissioner and
superintendent).
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officials who are not adversaries when conducting a quasi-judicial hearing,
are considered to be contesting parties when appearing before a reviewing
court to defend a determination made at such a hearing."' The supreme
court also has jurisdiction when a state officer intervenes in a case to repre-
sent the state's interests 2 or is named in his capacity as custodian of a state
fund from which payment may be ordered."3
6.060. CONCLUSION
There is an increasing need to view the various aspects of local govern-
ment and administrative law as parts of a single system by which the ever-
increasing complexity of social change is accommodated, and legally and
conceptually to organize and co-ordinate various institutions, ranging from
drainage districts to the executive departments, into a more efficient system
of regulation and services. This appears to have been the pervading ob-
jective in the framing of the 1945 Constitution."' Yet the supreme court
has been unable to orient the allocation of original appellate jurisdiction to
this integrated view of the governmental system. The effect of the court's
restrictive approach, apparently predicated upon whatever basis is conveni-
ent to distinguish and refuse jurisdiction in certain types of cases, is to break
up into jurisdictional segments the problems pertaining to state and local
systems.
51. E.g., Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1963) (review of revocation of
driver's license); Shelley v. Commission for the Blind, 309 Mo. 612, 274 S.W. 688
(1925) (en bane) (review of rejection of application for blind pension).
52. In the following cases the supreme court retained jurisdiction because the at-
torney general was held to be a contesting party: Gem Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien, 374
S.W.2d 109 (Mo. 1963) (en bane) (attorney general intervened in declaratory judg-
ment action to test legality of Sunday closing laws); Schley v. Conservation Comm'n,
329 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1959) (action to enjoin arrests of patrons of private lake for fish-
ing without license); Transport Rentals, Inc. v. Carpenter, 325 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959)
(declaratory judgment whether certain motor vehicles were subject to state registration
fee); Spiking School Dist. v. Purported Enlarged School Dist., 362 Mo. 848, 245
S.W.2d 13 (1952) (declaratory judgment to test validity of consolidation of common
school districts); Jones v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 Mo. 712, 243 S.W.2d
970 (1951) (attorney general intervened to argue that certain unpaid dividends should
escheat to the state).
53. Mossman v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 254 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). See also
Grant v. Neal, 381 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1964).
54. See Swindler, Mo. Constitutions: History, Theory and Practice, 23 Mo. L. REV.
32, 58-59, 157, 160-62, 165-66, 169-70, 177-78 (1958). See also Comm. No. 22, Address
to the People, Co miTTEE REPORTS OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1943-1944, file no. 21, at 4:
The governor is given the power to assign each of some existing seventy boards
and bureaus to that division of the executive . . . to which its work is germane.
This will simplify administration, and eliminate duplication of effort, thus facili-
tating the work of the department and reducing the cost of administration.
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There are several possible defects in this restrictive approach. Litigation
arising from the administration of state policies by corporate executive
commissions has been divided among the appellate forums. The same is
true of litigation arising from the alarming problems accompanying urban
development."5 Perhaps the courts of appeals are not as equipped to develop
special competence in handling this litigation, because when a case meets
the jurisdictional "amount" or raises a constitutional issue (which occurs
frequently in the area of public law) it must be transferred to the supreme
court. In other words, because of jurisdictional disadvantages, their experi-
ence in these matters must be acquired in piecemeal fashion. 6
However, these defects may be illusory, since the supreme court possesses
at least a theoretical means in article V, section ten by which it can supervise
the courts of appeals, allocate to itself the more important cases for final
hearing and assure uniformity in the case law." Whether the court can in
practice exercise this power depends upon whether it has time after dis-
posing of the docket of original appeals which it must hear (regardless of
whether those appeals present important questions of law). However, there
is a further detriment to the system of public law which cannot be even
theoretically resolved: appeals involving public bodies must pass initially
through the inefficiencies and delays existing at the original appellate juris-
dictional level. In addition, the time spent by courts in considering jurisdic-
tion decreases the total number of hours available to effectively handle the
merits of appeals. By thus weakening the efficiency of review of the accom-
modation processes in public law, the efficiency of those processes in general
is decreased.
The allocation of jurisdiction along the lines of systems of public law,
upon some basis other than convenience, is not inconceivable. It has been
achieved, perhaps inadvertently, in the cases concerning the state system of
55. See GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMM. ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INTERIM REP. 5
(1959):
The ills that are besetting the county and community governments in Missouri
have gathered almost imperceptibly during more than a century of governing
operations until, today, their cumulative effect constitutes a powerful cancerous
growth on the institutions of our local governments.
One might well consider as an anomaly the present situation in which the supreme
court hears appeals because townships are parties, but not when cities are parties
(§§ 6.041, .043). Since the latter units probably are involved in problems of greater
number and magnitude with regard to such matters as urban development, their ex-
clusion from the jurisdiction of the supreme court can be justified only by the need
to allocate the work load among the appellate tribunals.
56. See State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Mo. App. 609, 110 S.W.2d
367 (1937), discussed supra note 33.
57. See note 33 supra.
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taxation."' However, there remains one dilemma: if the supreme court
under the present system were to attempt a synthesis of jurisdictional rules
and the concept of public governmental systems, it could do so only by
abandoning its restrictive attitude, thereby increasing the number of cases
heard by it on original appeal. As long as this is not feasible because of the
press of its work load," the court has no practical alternative but to con-
tinue its present efforts to reduce its work load by artificial and technical
rules.
58. See §§ 3.030-.040.
59. For a discussion of the work load problem, see § 9.010, note 3.
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